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Abstract 
Corporate governance practices have been a concerned issue by many Asian countries after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 
including Malaysia. Due to the crisis, Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) has been introduced as part of the 
Bursa Malaysia (BMB) listing rules. This study hence focuses on corporate governance practices among Top 100 public listed 
companies in Bursa Malaysia and the relationship between corporate governance practices with firm performance. Two corporate 
governance’s indicators (Board size and Board Independence) were chosen in testing the hypothesized relationship between 
corporate governance practices with firm performance, which was measured by return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). Descriptive and correlation analysis were used to examine the hypotheses in this study. The result showed that board size 
has significantly weak negative relationship with ROA but it was found to be insignificant to ROE. The other finding indicated 
that there was no relationship between board independence and firm performance. This study provide useful information for 
policy makers or regulators in improving the corporate governance policies in the future and also helps in increasing 
understanding  on the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm’s performance. 
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1. Introduction  
Issues related to corporate governance is not new as it was emerged with the birth of corporation. However, this 
issue only received considerable attention due to the wave of CEO dismissals in the first half of 1990s and after the 
massive bankruptcies of Enron and World.com in the early 2000s. The issue of corporate governance in Asian 
countries including Malaysia has been a concern in the late 1990s following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) or named as 2001 Code was first issue in the year 2000 as a 
milestone in corporate governance reform in Malaysia. Many researchers argued that corporate governance plays an 
important role in controlling the firm’s operations (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen 1983). However, previous studies 
found mixed findings on the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm performance. This study 
investigate this issues with an aims to study the corporate governance practices among Top 100 PLCs in Malaysia 
and to gauge the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm’s performance.  
This paper is divided into 6 sections. The following section 2 and 3 discuss the relevant literatures and 
methodology applied in this study, respectively. Section 4 focuses on presenting the data analysis and results whilst 
the final two sections conclude and discuss the limitation and recommendation for future research.  
2. Literature Review 
This section explores and discusses the related literatures related to the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. Details of dependent variables and independent variables was discussed in the 
following section. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance became an attractive issue for Asian researchers especially after financial crisis in 1997. 
Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in Malaysia has defined corporate governance as ‘the process and 
structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company towards enhancing business prosperity 
and corporate accountability with the ultimate objective.’ From the economic perspective, corporate governance 
plays an important role in achieving an efficiency in which scarce funds are moved to investment project with the 
highest returns. It is also became a crucial determinants for institutional investments (Bushee et al., 2007) and 
components of institutional investors’ reform initiatives (Karpoff, 2001). There are two categories of corporate 
governance mechanisms which are internal mechanism (e.g. board size, board independence and board of directors) 
and external mechanism (e.g. competitive market conditions, the market for managerial labor and talent and market 
for corporate control). In this study, two of the most influential internal indicators of corporate governance were 
used which are Board Size and Board Independence. These indicators are explained in the following subsections. 
 
2.1.1 Board Size 
 
The definition of board size is the total number of directors on a board (Panasian et al., 2003; Levrau and Van 
den Berghe, 2007). An optimal board size should include both the executive and non-executive directors (Goshi et 
al., 2002). The effectiveness in structuring the board is important for governing the company. Board size has been 
found to vary between one country and another as every country has different cultures. This means that there has no 
optimal and standard board size among the companies in the world. Heidrick and Struggles (2007), in their study of 
corporate governance among European firms have found that firms in United Kingdom, Switzerland and Holland 
tend to have a small board size while Belgium, France, Spain and Germany tend to have a large board size (Thirteen 
to nineteen members). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) claimed that the board members on board should be between eight 
and nine while Leblanc and Gillies (2003) preferred eight to eleven persons on board. A board with thirteen 
members is an optimal board size for most small and medium companies. Epstein et al. (2002) and Goshi et al. 
(2002) claimed that an average of sixteen directors may be considered optimal for large companies. These views are 
opposed from view of Florackis and Ozkan (2004) as they argued that boards with more than seven or eight 
members are unlikely to be effective. In Malaysia and Singapore, Mak and Yuanto (2003) stated that companies’ 
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performance was highest when their boards consist of five members. According to John and Senbet (1998), the 
determination of board size is depended on forces outside the market system. In reality, there has no optimal board 
size as the right size for a board should be decided by effectiveness of a board to operate as a team (Conger and 
Lawler, 2009).  
 
2.1.2 Board Independence 
 
Board independence refers to percentage of the total number of independent non-executive directors to the total 
number of directors (Prabowo and Simpson, 2011). It was also defined as level of presence of independent directors 
or presence of non-executive directors in the board (Abdullah and Nasir, 2004). According to BMB Listing 
Requirement, listed companies need to have a balance on the board of directors with at least two Directors or one-
third of board members must be independent. Thus, boards of directors are more independent with the increase of 
independent directors (John and Senbet, 1998). 
 
2.2 Firm Performance 
 
This study use ROA and ROE as the measurement of financial performance for the selected companies. Many 
previous studies using ROA (Brick et al., 2006; Cheng, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Brown and Caylor, 2005; 
Klein, 1998) and ROE (Lo, 2003) as their firm performance measures. ROA is defined as net income before interest 
expense for the fiscal period divided by total assets for that same period. It shows the amount of earning that have 
been generated from an invested capital assets (Epps and Cereola, 2008) and incorporates firm’s profitability and 
efficiency by shareholders and all of the stakeholders. ROA measurement is a well-understood measure of the 
organizations (Kim, 2005) and it represented the actual firm performance (Ponnu, 2008). ROE is defined as the 
income before interest expense for the fiscal period divided by total shareholders’ equity for that same period. ROE 
has been proven to be a trusted performance measure for corporate stakeholders (Johnson and Greening, 1999) and 
it is suitable both in short-term and long-term for most investors (Brealey and Myers, 2000). Overall, ROE is a 
measure that shows an investor how much profit can be generated by the firm, using the money invested from its 
shareholders (Epps and Cereola, 2008).       
 
2.3 Relationship between Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Performance 
 
2.3.1 Relationship between Board Size and Firm Performance 
 
It cannot be denied that board size is the one of an important mechanism of effective corporate governance (Bonn 
et al. 2004). Despite considerable amount of effort in research on board size, there are still no consensus answers 
among researchers. Based on previous studies, some researchers indicated that there is positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance (Shukeri et al., 2012; Adam and Mehran, 2003; Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003). Lakhal (2005) found that there is a positive but weak relationship between board size and firm 
performance. In addition, Chen et al. (2006) also found that board size is positively related to firm’s earning per 
share (EPS) among listed companies in China while Shukeri et al. (2012) indicated that board size positively 
influences firm’s return on assets (ROA). In another study by Sanda et al. (2003), small board size was found to be 
positively correlates with firm performance but this statement is opposed when it comes to a large board.  
On the other hand, some researchers argued that there has negative relationship between these two variables 
(Mishra et al., 2001; Singh and Davidson, 2003). Forbes and Milliken (1999) also argued that board size is not truly 
a demographic attitudes, thus it is unlikely to affect the board functioning. This statement is also supported by 
Holthauson and Larcker (1993) who are failed to relate board size with firm performance. Eisenberg et al. (1998) 
also found negative correlation between board size and profitability when using sample of small and medium 
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2.3.2 Relationship between Board Independence and Firm Performance 
 
Past studies showed that there was an argument for board independence issues among researchers. Some 
researchers found that board independence can provide benefits to companies (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2009; 
Zubaidah et al., 2009; Rhodes et al., 2010) while some disagree (Chen et al., 2006; Conger and Lawler, 2009; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). According to Abdullah (2004), independent directors can bring independence into the 
board and add to diversity of skills and expertise of the directors. Independent directors are able to alleviate agency 
problems and curb managerial self-interest (Rhodes et al., 2000). Through agency theory, managers would tend to 
pursue their own goals at the expense of shareholders due to the separation between ownership and control (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). With the emerge of independent directors, this problem can be solved as they can contribute to 
reduce the management consumption of perquisites (Brickley and James, 1987) and led to better auditing systems 
(Salleh et al., 2005). This is why the Code regarded improving board composition to ensure that there are effective 
independent directors on the board and that the decision process is independently carried out. Besides that, increase 
of independent directors on the board can protect the shareholders’ interests (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2009) and 
have above-average stock price returns (Dennis and Sarin, 1997). Therefore, companies with more independent 
directors tend to be more profitable compared to those with fewer independent directors (You et al., 1986). 
According to Fama (1980), independent directors were hired to ensure that competition among insiders stimulates 
actions consistent with shareholder value maximization. Independent directors are also useful for monitoring board 
activities and improving the transparency of corporate boards as they improved the firm’s compliance with the 
disclosure requirements (Chen and Jaggi, 2000).  
Previous studies showed that the result for relationship between board independence and firm performance are 
mixed. Dehaene et al. (2001) unveiled that a proportion of independent directors has a positive correlated ROE 
among Belgian companies. This finding is supported by Byrd et al. (2010) as he pointed out a significant positive 
effect of independent directors on firm performance. Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2009) claimed that board 
independence only has an effect on firms with average performance; firms with below average performance are not 
affected. On the other hand, Chen et al. (2006) claimed that the percentage of independent directors on boards has 
little impact on overall firm performance. Inversely, research by Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) found no evidence 
that board independence affects firm performance. This result was consistent with another study conducted by Klein 
et al. (2005). 
 
2.4 Conceptual Framework 
 
Four hypotheses were developed in this study, which are presented in the following Figure 1.0 
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The main component of this study consist of the corporate governance practices which are indicated by board 
size and board independence (independent variables) whereas the firm performance was measured by using firm’s 
Return on Assets (ROA) and firm’s Return on Equity (ROE) (dependent variables). The following are hypotheses 
developed to be tested in this study.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between board size and firm’s ROA. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between board size and firm’s ROE. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between board independence and firm’s ROA. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between board independence and firm’s ROE. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research Design 
 
This study was relying on quantitative design. Statistical analysis, table or graph was typically applied in this 
study. The evaluation and assessment of the firm performance was according to the data gathered from the 
company’s’ annual report. 
 
3.2 Sampling and Data Collection 
 
This research is limited to the Top 100 public listed companies in BMB, covering the period from 2008 to 2012. 
Companies with insufficient data were eliminated and not be replaced in order to sustain the originality of data 
sampling. After data collection process was completed, it was found that there were only 86 companies suited to be 
used as samples in this study. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to assess and analyze the collected data to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance practices and firm performance. There are two methods of analysis used 
in this study, which are descriptive and correlation analysis. These methods were used as the underlying statistical 
tests to describe the original characteristics of a data set and are the key to summarizing variables, and also 
examining the relationship between two different variables. 
4. Data Analysis and Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
      Variables N Minimum   Maximum      Mean     Standard Deviation 
        BSIZE 86       5.0         13.2            8.9279         1.8494 
        BIND 86      0.20         0.82            0.4603         0.11264 
        ROA 86     -0.25        0.508           0.08655         0.08262 
        ROE 86     -0.350       1.700           0.19878         0.25921 
    Table 1: Descriptive statistics results 
 
The mean value of the board size was 8.9279 persons (approximately to 9 persons), and the standard deviation 
was 1.8494 (approximately to 2). This low standard deviation indicated that the data tends to be very close to the 
mean. Thus, the average number of board of directors of most samples was identified as between 7 and 11 persons.  
292   Shafi e Mohamed Zabri et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  35 ( 2016 )  287 – 296 
The mean ratio of the board independence was 0.4603, and the standard deviation was 0.11264. This indicated 
that the average ratio of board independence in the board of most samples was located between 0.3477 and 0.5729. 
 On the other hand, the mean value of ROA over past five years was 0.0866 with the standard deviation of 
0.0826. Therefore, the average mean of ROA was between 0.004 and 0.1692. For firm’s ROE, the mean value of 
ROE was 0.19878 with the standard deviation of 0.25921. This indicated that the average mean of ROE was 
between -0.0643 and 0.45799. 
 
4.2 Correlation Test 
 
The following table shows the result of Spearman’s Correlation Test. 
 
        ROA   ROE 
       Spearman’s rho BSIZE Correlation Coefficient -0.214* -0.139 
       Sig. (2-tailed)  0.048 0.201 
    N   86 86 
   BIND Correlation Coefficient 0.030 0.060 
    Sig. (2-tailed)  0.786 0.582 
    N   86 86 
                                                  *. Correlation is significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 2: Result of Correlation Test 
 
Correlation analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between two variables. A strong or high 
correlation means that two or more variables have a strong relationship with each other. On the other hand, a weak 
or low correlation means that the variables are hardly related. Correlation coefficients reveal the strength of the 
relationship between two variables and the direction of relationship (positive and negative). It can range from -1.00 
(a perfect negative value) to +1.00 (a perfect positive value). It can be justified that there is no relationship between 
the variables being tested if the value is 0.00.  
 
4.3 Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
For hypothesis 1 (relationship between board size with ROA), the correlation coefficient was -0.214. This 
negative value indicated that these two variables have weak negative correlation. This means that the board size was 
inversely proportional to firms’ ROA. The larger size of board will cause the lower firms’ ROA. The significance 
value of p=0.048 was less than 0.05, this means that the value was significance, thus the H1 is accepted. It can be 
concluded that there is a statistically significant relationship between board size and firms’ ROA. For hypothesis 2 
(relationship between board size with ROE), the correlation coefficient was -0.139. This negative value indicated 
that these two variables have weak negative correlation. This means that the board size was inversely proportional to 
firms’ ROE. The larger size of board will cause the lower firms’ ROE. The significance value of p=0.201 was more 
than 0.05, this means that the value was insignificant, thus the H0 is accepted. It can be concluded that there is no 
relationship between board sizes with firms’ ROE. These results show that the relationship between board size and 
firm performance was inconclusive.  
The negative values of correlation coefficient with ROA (-0.214) and with ROE (-0.139) indicated that there is a 
weak negative correlation between these two variables. The negative correlation indicated that smaller board size 
can lead to better firm performance. This finding was consistent with Cheng (2008), Florackis and Ozkan (2004) 
and Byard et al. (2006) who indicated that a smaller board was better than a larger board. Previous research 
conducted by Mak and Yuanto (2003) in Malaysia and Singapore showed that firm performance was highest when 
their boards consist of five members.  Byard et al. (2006) argued that smaller board is better in monitoring the 
decision-making. Cheng (2008) also supported this statement as he claimed that it may face problem for company to 
plan for board meetings and for board to have united answer during meeting when they are having larger board size. 
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For hypothesis 3 (relationship between board independence with ROA), the correlation coefficient was 0.03. This 
indicated that these two variables have weak positive correlation. This means that the board independence was 
proportional to firms’ ROA. The higher ratio of board independence will cause higher firms’ ROA. The significance 
value of p=0.786 was more than 0.05, this means that the value was insignificant, thus the H0 is accepted. It can be 
concluded that there is no significant relationship between board independence with firms’ ROA. For hypothesis 4 
(relationship between board independence with ROE), the correlation coefficient was 0.06 with p=0.582. This 
results indicated that these two variables have a weak positive correlation and H0 is accepted.  
The results of hypothesis 3 and 4 shows that there are no relationships between board independence and firm 
performance, as the significant value of firms’ ROA (p=0.786) and firms’ ROE (p=0.582) were insignificant. Joher 
and Mohd Ali (2005) indicated that the presence of independent non-executive directors in board does not provide 
any significant explanation for firm performance. Ponnu and Karthigeyan (2010) stated that there was no strong 
evidence that recommend principles in MCCG as regards independent directors have any positive effect on 
corporate performance. This result was also consistent with Johari et al. (2008) and Wan Yusoff and Alhaji (2012) 
who argued that board independence has no effect on firm performance after they have analyzed 813 Malaysian 
public listed companies from 2009 to 2011. Hashim and Devi (2005) also failed to find any significant evidence on 
the relationship between proportion of independence directors and firm performance with samples of 280 Malaysian 
public listed companies. The research which was conducted by Tham and Romuald (2012) using 20 listed 
companies in BMB from the period of 2006 to 2010 also found no relationship between the board independence 
with firm performance.  
5. Conclusion 
This study was conducted to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
The dependent variables (corporate governance) used board size and board independence as indicators while the 
independent variables (firm performance) used firm’s ROA and ROE as indicators. There were two objectives 
established which were (1) to investigate the corporate governance practices among Top 100 listed companies, and 
(2) to study the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The first objective was achieved 
by using descriptive analysis whereas the second objective which consisted of four hypotheses was achieved by 
using correlation analysis. The results of first objective shows that the average number of directors in board and the 
average ratio of board independence among Top 100 Malaysian public listed companies from 2008 to 2012 were 9 
persons and 46% respectively. The result of second objective shows that there is a mixed relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. 
6.  Limitation and Recommendation for Future Research 
This study was limited to Top 100 Malaysian public listed companies from 2008 to 2012. Among the samples, 
there are 86 companies that can be used as other samples cannot provide full set of information which is needed in 
this study. This would cause the samples not to properly represent the whole population. There are few companies 
that have changed the time period of their annual reports due to their companies’ internal decisions. This could 
affect the accuracy of data as well. Another concern which may also affect the accuracy of data was external factors 
such as economic recession.  Finally, there is only two indicators used for each of the variable which are board size 
and board independence (corporate governance practices) and firms’ ROA and ROE (firm performance). Different 
results will be obtained by using different indicators. 
This study can be improved by analyzing a longer time period. It is recommended that the financial data ranging 
over 20 years would be reliable. It cannot be denied that the longer time period of research can provide more 
accurate results. There are possible numbers of variables that can be used to investigate the determinants of 
corporate governance practices and firm performance. This study only used board size and board independence as 
the tools to indicate the corporate governance practices of companies. Besides other internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance such as ownership structure, board meeting, audit committees and etcetera. Future researchers 
can use external mechanisms as well. On the contrary, firms’ ROA and ROE was used to indicate the firm 
performance. There are still many other indicators such as earning per share (EPS), Tobin’s Q can be used to 
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examine the firm performance. Number of samples can also be expanded as it can widen the scope and quality of the 
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